Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 3

Article 19

2010

Sure and Expedited Resolution of Disputes: The Federal
Arbitration Act and the One-Year Requirement for Summary
Confirmation of Arbitration Awards, A
Matthew R. Kissling

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew R. Kissling, Sure and Expedited Resolution of Disputes: The Federal Arbitration Act and the OneYear Requirement for Summary Confirmation of Arbitration Awards, A, 60 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 889 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol60/iss3/19

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

"A SURE AND EXPEDITED
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES":*
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND
THE ONE-YEAR REQUIREMENT FOR
SUMMARY CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARDS
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a "highly favored" mode of dispute resolution
throughout the American judicial system.' Generally, arbitration
presents an opportunity for parties to settle their differences using an
2
independent third-party arbitrator. The arbitrator serves as the trier of
fact, and conducts hearings in lieu of a judicial proceeding. 3 As a
result, arbitration offers disputing parties "speedy and inexpensive
trial[s] before specialists," while also "eas[ing] the workload of the
courts.'A
In order to further the purposes of arbitration at the national level,
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925.
The overall purpose of the FAA is to "reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . .. and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 6 The FAA
governs commercial arbitration and provides parties with a series of
* Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting In re Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1994)).
' Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993).
2 See Daniel D. Derner & Roger S. Haydock, Confirming an Arbitration Award, 23 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 879, 880 (1997) ("With arbitration, parties can resolve their disputes fairly
and privately by having an arbitrator issue a binding award following a hearing.").
3 See Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice?, 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 761
(2001) (identifying the arbitrator's role as both trier of fact and trier of law).
4 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 152 (alterations in
original) (quoting, inter alia,
Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980)).
5 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)). The statute is now known as the Federal Arbitration Act.
6 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).

889

890

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

guidelines and procedures for any disputes that are submitted for
resolution. In effect, the FAA creates a body of "federal substantive
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
coverage of the [FAA]." By doing so, the FAA guarantees that
"arbitration has the same power and ability to decide cases as
traditional court litigation." 9
As a part of these provisions, the FAA provides for summary
confirmation of arbitration awards. 10 This confirmation process,
governed by 9 U.S.C. § 9, allows a prevailing party to file an
application with a court to confirm an arbitration award. In relevant
part, section 9 states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment
of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to
the arbitration,

. .

. then at any time within one year after the

award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award, and
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award
is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of this title."
Thus, if a party applies for award confirmation under section 9, the
court must confirm it unless the award is "vacated, modified, or
corrected" pursuant to other provisions of the FAA.12 This process
has the effect of a summary proceeding, which disposes of the
award's confirmation in a prompt and efficient manner.' 3 Section 9 is
critical to arbitration's goals because confirmation of an award
renders the arbitrated issue res judicata. 14 As a result, judicial
7 Teresa L. Elliott, Conflicting Interpretationsof the One-Year Requirement on Motions
to Confirm Arbitration Awards, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 661 (2005) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16 (2000)).
8 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
("[Q]uestions of arbitrability ... [should] be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration.").
9 Elliott, supra note 7, at 661.
10 See 9 U.S.C. §9 (2006).
1 Id.
12 Id.
'3 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 1402 (2008)
(explaining that summary confirmation is an expedited and streamlined process).
14 See Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 261, 266 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[R]es
judicata is applicable to arbitration awards and may serve to bar the subsequent relitigation of
a single issue or an entire claim." (quoting In re Claim of Ranni, 444 N.E.2d 1328, 1329
(N.Y. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Erika Van Ausdall, Confirmation of
Arbitral Awards: The Confusion Surrounding Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 49
DRAKE L. REv. 41, 47 (2000) ("[Jludicial confirmation of the award is crucial because it gives
the award the same effect as a court judgment, precluding de novo litigation of the issues
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confirmation establishes a sense of finality in matters resolved by
arbitration.
While the confirmation process appears relatively straightforward,
the language of section 9 has been subject to conflicting
interpretations at the federal level. In particular, circuit courts are
split over the time period during which a party may file for judicial
confirmation under section 9. As noted above, the provision provides
that "at any time within one year after the [arbitration] award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court . . . for an order

confirming the award."" The courts have struggled over whether
this language creates a one-year statute of limitations for summary
award confirmation under the FAA.
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have adopted a permissive
interpretation of section 9, holding that the provision does not create a
mandatory one-year limitations period.16 On the other hand, the
Second Circuit follows a mandatory interpretation of the statute,
holding that section 9 does impose a one-year statute of limitations.17
In support of their interpretation, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
argue that a permissive reading of section 9 not only comports with
the statute's normal reading 8 but also promotes judicial economy, a
key objective of arbitration.19 The courts argue that if faced with a
strict one-year limitations period, parties will be discouraged from
utilizing the FAA's devices and will instead file a separate action at
20
law to enforce an award.
Such a permissive interpretation has several important weaknesses.
First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the mere presence
of permissive language in a statute does not render the provision itself
21
permissive. Instead, courts must look to the statute's structure
and legislative purpose for guidance.2 2 Second, while a permissive

resolved through arbitration.").
15 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).
16 See Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 581 (8th Cir. 1998) ("We
hold that § 9 is a permissive statute and does not require that a party file for confirmation within
one year."); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that section 9 "must be interpreted as its plain language indicates, as a permissive
provision which does not bar the confirmation of an award beyond a one-year period").
17 See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
18 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 151 (asserting that an examination of the language "gives rise
to the inference that Congress understood the plain meaning of 'may' to be permissive").
19 See Val-U, 146 F.3d at 581; Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155.
20 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 (noting that a mandatory interpretation will encourage
parties to file actions at law to confirm arbitration awards to the detriment of judicial economy).
21 See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198-99
(2000); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983).
22 See Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 199.
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interpretation may encourage parties to submit disputes to arbitration,
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits seem to assume that such a decision
will be based solely on the type of time limitation imposed by section
9.23 Finally, a permissive interpretation will essentially leave the
FAA's summary confirmation process without a statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court has held that in such situations, courts are to
24
utilize analogous state statutes of limitations. The states, however,
are not uniform in the necessary time period for summary
confirmation.2 5 The obvious result is that the availability of section 9
confirmation will be inconsistent on a national scale.
In light of these weaknesses, a permissive interpretation of section
9 is neither appropriate nor necessary. Instead, the mandatory
one-year statute of limitations proposed by the Second Circuit
better fulfills the intent of Congress and the purposes of FAA
arbitration,26 while also promoting consistency in the availability of
summary confirmation on a national scale. Therefore, this Note
proposes that the mandatory interpretation should be adopted to
impose a one-year statute of limitations for summary confirmation
under section 9.
Part I of the Note will provide a brief history of the FAA and the
purposes behind the statute's enactment. In addition, it will examine
the current circuit split over the interpretation of section 9. Given this
Note's advocacy for the Second Circuit's mandatory interpretation,
the remaining sections will discuss several reasons in support of this
reading. Part II will explain why a mandatory one-year limitations
period best fits the language and structure of section 9. Part III will
demonstrate that this interpretation is more effective in not only
fulfilling section 9's purpose as an expedited confirmation process but
also in promoting both of the primary goals of FAA arbitration:
judicial economy and finality.
Part IV will discuss how a mandatory one-year limitations period
ensures that section 9's procedures are consistently available on a
national scale. Finally, Part V argues that, in light of the ability to toll
23 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 (observing that construing section 9 as a statute of
limitations will frustrate judicial economy); see also Val-U, 146 F.3d at 581 (adopting the
Fourth Circuit's rationale in Sverdrup).
24 See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983) (observing that, in
the absence of a statute of limitations for a federal law, the Court "has generally concluded that
Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under
state law").
25 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1288 (West 2007) (allowing four years for summary
confirmation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-417 (West 2005) (imposing a one year limitations
period); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-12 (West 1999) (giving parties twenty years for satisfaction
of a court judgment).
26 See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2003).
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a statute of limitations, a permissive interpretation of section 9 is
simply not necessary to fulfill the objectives of the FAA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Purpose of the FAA
Before examining the dispute over section 9's time limitations, it is
important first to understand the history and purpose behind the FAA.
By enacting the FAA in 1925, Congress intended to curb traditional
judicial animosity toward arbitration agreements.27 The American
courts inherited this hostility from their English predecessors at
28
common law. Viewing such animosity as a serious problem,
Congress passed the FAA to replace "judicial indisposition to
arbitration with a 'national policy favoring [it] and plac[ing]
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts."'29
In furtherance of this policy, Congress intended for the FAA to
protect the enforceability of arbitration agreements,30 as well as
ensure their "rapid and unobstructed enforcement." 31 To do so,
Congress crafted the FAA to include sixteen General Provisions,3 2
which govern nearly every stage of an arbitration brought under the
FAA. For example, the General Provisions allow for a party to
petition a court to compel arbitration,33 permit a court to stay judicial
proceedings if a matter can be referred to arbitration, and allow a
court to "vacate, modify, and correct" awards in limited instances. 35
The comprehensive nature of these provisions manifests "a liberal
27 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) ("[The FAA's]
purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements .... ).
28 See Van Ausdall, supra note 14, at 45 n.18 ("[T]he Act was designed to overcome
anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed
from English common law." (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985))).
29 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (alterations in
original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
30 See Van Ausdall, supra note 14, at 45; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at
443-44 (noting that Congress enacted the FAA to ensure that "[a] written provision in . . . a
contract ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract ... [is] valid, irrevocable,and enforceable." (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000))).
31 Karyn A. Doi, Recent Developments: Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Construction Co., 16 Otlo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 409, 409 (2001) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
33 Id. § 4.
- Id. § 3.
35 Id. §§ 10-l.
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federal policy favoring arbitration" 36 and seeks to resolve disputes "as
quickly and easily as possible."
Summary confirmation of arbitration awards is another device
used to further the FAA's policies and objectives and its goal of rapid
and efficient enforcement. 38 Section 9 governs the confirmation
of arbitration awards, 39 and provides an expedited process through
which parties may seek confirmation of an arbitration award as a
court judgment.40 Section 9's language, however, also creates a
possible barrier to summary confirmation. Section 9 provides that "at
any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply .

.

. for an order confirming the award." 41 The

federal circuit courts are split over whether this language imposes a
mandatory one-year statute of limitations. The circuits' conflicting
interpretations are discussed in more detail below.
B. Conflicting Interpretationsof Section 9
The circuit dispute centers around whether the phrase "may apply"
imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing an application to
confirm an arbitration award. 42 On one side are the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits, which hold that use of the word "may" makes section 9
merely permissive.43 However, the Second Circuit differs and finds
that section 9 imposes a mandatory one-year filing period."
1. The Permissive Interpretation
The Fourth Circuit first set forth the permissive interpretation in
Sverdrup Corp. v.WHC Constructors, Inc.45 In that case, a dispute
arose during the construction of a package development center.4
Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, Sverdrup and
36Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
37 Id. at 23.

38 Id. at 22.
3 9 U.S.C. § 9.
40 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 1402 (2008)
(explaining that summary confirmation is an expedited and streamlined process); BLACK'S LAW
DicrIoNARY 1242 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a summary proceeding as "[a] nonjury proceeding
that settles a controversy or disposes of a case in a relatively prompt and simple manner").
41 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).
42 See Elliott, supra note 7, at 662 ("The circuits are split over whether the word 'may'
means that an application to confirm need not be filed within one year or if § 9 imposes a
one-year statute of limitations on applications to confirm an arbitration award.").
43 See Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 581 (8th Cir. 1998);
Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1993).
44 See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
45 989 F.2d 148.
46Id. at 149.
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WHC submitted their dispute to arbitration.4 7 In September 1990, the
arbitrator issued an award in favor of Sverdrup in the amount of
$419,456.07.48
Sverdrup, however, did not file for section 9 summary
confirmation of the award until October 8, 1991, roughly thirty-eight
days after the one-year anniversary of the arbitrator's award
announcement.49 In denying confirmation of the award, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina interpreted
section 9 as a mandatory one-year statute of limitations and held
Sverdrup's motion to be time-barred.50 The court then dismissed the
claim and Sverdrup appealed.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that other circuits had interpreted
52
section 9's time limit as permissive. The court also noted that a
permissive interpretation is supported by section 9's language,
recognizing that "[t]he word [m]ay in a statute . . . "normally confers

a discretionary power, not a mandatory power, unless the legislative
intent, as evidenced by the legislative history, evidences a contrary
purpose."5 3 In examining the language at issue, the court determined
that Congress intended "may" to be permissive within section 9.54
The court found it critical that the provision "states that any party
'may apply' for a confirmation order but the court 'must grant' the
order absent a modification or vacation under §§ 10 or 11.",5 Because
both permissive and mandatory language appeared throughout the
statute, the court concluded that Congress intended for the word
"may" to be permissive.56
In deciding how to interpret section 9, the court also considered
the purposes behind arbitration and the FAA.57 The court
47

Id. at 149-50.

4 Id. at 150.
49 Id.
50 See id. (citing Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 542 (D.S.C.

1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1993)).

5 Id.
52 See id. at 150 ("Sverdrup relied heavily on cases from other jurisdictions which have
addressed § 9 and have held that the one-year time period for application to a district court is
permissive rather than mandatory."). The court cited to, among others, the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 120 (6th Cir. 1953). See Sverdrup,
989 F.2d at 151.
53 Id. at 151 (second alteration and omission in original) (quoting Dalton v. United States,
816 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 See id.
ss Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988)).
56 See id. ("Congress was cognizant of the difference in meaning between 'may' and
'must' and intended the term 'may' to be construed as permissive.").
57 See id. ("Under the circumstances, it is necessary to inquire into the legislative intent of
the FAA to determine which proposed construction is most compatible with the purposes of the
Act." (citing Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 1984))).
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acknowledged arbitration's status as a favored method of dispute
resolution, both in terms of judicial economy and the benefit to the
parties involved.ss It also recognized that confirmation under the FAA
is not the sole means of enforcing an arbitration award, 59 since parties
may always resort to an action at law.60 In light of these factors, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that imposing a one-year statute of limitations
under section 9 would "be an exercise in futility";61 parties who failed
to meet the deadline would simply file an action at law. 62 Because an
action at law does not involve the summary process invoked under
section 9,63 the court cautioned that limiting the availability of
summary confirmation would hurt judicial economy and "inevitably
lead to inefficiency, delay and court congestion."" Furthermore, the
court warned of the potential for a "proliferation of confirmation
motions," which it believed would result from a mandatory
limitations period.6 5
Following the Fourth Circuit's lead, the Eighth Circuit also
adopted a permissive interpretation of section 9 in Val-U
Construction Co. of South Dakota v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe.66 The
parties in Val-U had executed a construction contract in 1989 to build
housing units on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation.6 Like
Sverdrup, the contract contained an arbitration clause. 8 When a
dispute arose and Val-U demanded arbitration, the Tribe refused

58 See id. at 152 ("[The FAA's] chief benefits lie in providing 'speedy and inexpensive
trial[s] before specialists' and in 'eas[ing] the workload of the courts."' (quoting, inter alia,
Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Phillip & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980))); see
also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (noting that
arbitration should enable parties to "be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the
courts").
59 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 ("The FAA supplemented rather than extinguished any
previously existing remedies.").
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Unlike § 9's summary process, an action at law to enforce an arbitration award not only
places the burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement but also potentially allows for
virtually any common law contract defense. See Robert J. Gruendel, Domestic Law and
InternationalConventions, the Imperfect Overlay: The FAA as a Case Study, 75 TUL. L. REV.
1489, 1504 (2001).
64 Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395,404 (1967)).
65 Id.; see also id. at 156 ("If § 9 was given the effect of a statute of limitations,
individuals would be forced to protect their awards gained through arbitration by filing motions
to confirm in every case.").
- 146 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 1998).
67

Id. at 575.

68

Id.
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under a claim of sovereign immunity and instead filed a separate suit
in federal court.69
While the litigation was pending, the parties went to arbitration
and, on June 18, 1991, the arbitrator granted an award in favor of
Val-U.70 At the subsequent trial, the federal district court in South
Dakota found that the Tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity, dismissed
Val-U's various claims, and refused to enforce the arbitration
award. 7 1 Val-U appealed and the Eighth Circuit held that the
arbitration clause waived the Tribe's right to sovereign immunity, and
remanded to the district court to determine the validity of the
arbitration award.7 2
On remand, the district court held that the Tribe was barred from
challenging the arbitration award under the doctrine of res judicata
and ordered enforcement of the award.73 The Tribe again appealed to
the Eighth Circuit, arguing, among other things, that confirmation of
Val-U's arbitration award was time-barred under section 9.74
In a brief discussion, the Eighth Circuit cited the Fourth Circuit's
permissive interpretation with approval. The court agreed that
construing section 9 to be a mandatory statute of limitations "would
merely encourage, at the expense of judicial economy, the use of
another analogous method of enforcing [arbitration] awards."76 In
addition, the court reasoned that Congress would not have used the
permissive term "may" if it had intended for section 9 to be a statute
of limitations. For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit held that section
9 is a merely permissive provision and does not prohibit a party
from seeking summary confirmation of an arbitration award after one
year.

69

Id.

id at 575-76 (noting that the Tribe was absent during the arbitration and that the
arbitrator rendered an award for Val-U in the amount of $793,943.58, plus interest, fees, and
costs).
71 See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., Civ. No. 91-3019, slip op. at I (D.S.D.
Mar. 30, 1994).
72 See Val-U, 146 F.3d at 576 (citing Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d
560 (8th Cir. 1995)).
7 See id.
7 See id. at 580 ("The Tribe asserts that ... [the] motion [to confirm] was not made until
August 10, 1993, more than two years after the award was entered.").
7 See id. at 581.
76 Id. (quoting Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 155 (4th Cir.
1993)) (referring to the use of an action at law as an alternative means of obtaining award
enforcement).
7 See id. ("If Congress intended for the one year period to be a statute of limitations, then
it could have used the word 'must' or 'shall' in place of 'may' in the language of the statute.").
78 Id.
70 See
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2. The Mandatory Interpretation
Despite the positions of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the
Second Circuit adopted the opposing view and embraced a mandatory
interpretation of section 9. In Photopaint Technologies, L.L.C. v.
Smartlens Corp.,79 the Second Circuit held that section 9 imposes a
strict one-year statute of limitations for confirmation of an arbitration
award.so Under this view, a motion to confirm an award filed after the
one-year period is time-barred.
In Photopaint, the parties entered into a license agreement that
contained an arbitration clause in which each party agreed to submit
any dispute arising under the contract to binding arbitration.82 When a
dispute arose in October 1999, the parties went to arbitration where
the arbitrator ultimately granted an award in favor of Photopaint.83
The award provided that the license agreement was voidable and that
either party could rescind the agreement within thirty days of receipt
of the final award.84 The award also stated that if Smartlens voided
the agreement first, it would pay Photopaint the sum of $384,000; if
Photopaint rescinded first, Smartlens would pay $320,000.
After learning of the final award, the parties agreed to continue
private settlement negotiations,8 6 as well as extend any time
limitations during negotiations.87 Through these agreements, the
negotiations continued past the one-year anniversary of the
arbitrator's award decision. The negotiations eventually broke down
and Photopaint rescinded the license agreement, demanding the
$320,000 payment provided for in the final award.89 When Smartlens
refused to pay, Photopaint filed an application to confirm the award
under section 9.90 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed Photopaint's application, holding that
335 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2003).

7

0 Id. at 154.

8' See id. at 160 ("[A] party to an arbitration is entitled to the benefits of the streamlined
summary proceeding only if, as it may do, it files at any time within one year after the award is
made.").
82 Id. at 154.
8 See id.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 155 (describing a series of subsequent letter agreements between the parties
that allowed them to continue negotiations).
8 See id; see also Jeffrey R. Babbin et al., Developments in the Second Circuit:
2002-2003, 36 CoNN. L. REv. 1187, 1196 (2004) ("[Tlhe parties ... entered into a series of
letter agreements extending all applicable time limitations while their discussions continued.").
88 The Final Award was issued on May 26, 2000, but negotiations continued until July
2001. See Photopaint,335 F.3d at 154-55.
89 Id. at 155.

9 Id.
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it was time-barred under section 9 because it was filed after expiration
of the provision's one-year time period. 91
On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized that the principal issue
was "whether [the] wording [of section 9] creates a one-year statute
of limitations."9 2 Photopaint argued that because the statute used
"may," a permissive verb, instead of "must" when referencing the
one-year period, section 9 did not create a mandatory statute of
limitations.93 The court acknowledged that in other situations, "when
the same [statute] uses both 'may' and 'shall', the normal inference is
that each is used in its usual sense-the one act being permissive, the
other mandatory." 94 Despite the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' reliance
on this inference in holding section 9 to be permissive,95 however,
the Photopaint court declined to do so and instead found section 9's
one-year period to be mandatory.9 6
The Second Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision
in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co.,9 which
analyzed whether the use of "may" in the FAA's venue provisions
rendered the provisions mandatory or permissive.98 The Second
Circuit noted that, although the Supreme Court found the venue
provisions to be permissive, "it expressly declined to rely on the
permissiveness of 'may' as a matter of plain meaning."99 Instead, the
Cortez Byrd Court reasoned that such permissive language "is not
necessarily conclusive of congressional intent to provide for a
permissive or discretionary authority." 1a Relying on its own
precedent, the Supreme Court stated that the normal meaning of

9' See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 193, 202, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grounds & vacated, 335 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2003).
9 Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 156. The court announced that the issue was one of first
impression for the Second Circuit. See id.
9 Id. ("As Photopaint emphasizes, the permissive verb 'may,' rather than the mandatory
verb 'must,' is used in the clause affording one year to the party wishing to confirm an award,
while 'must' is used elsewhere in the same section and in other sections of the FAA.").
9 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir.
2001)); see also Rastelli v. Warden, Metro. Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986)
(declaring, in the context of a federal statute governing review of parole decisions, that "[t]he
use of a permissive verb-'may review' instead of 'shall review'-suggests a discretionary
rather than mandatory process").
9 See Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 156 ("Both the Fourth and the Eighth Circuits have relied
on this 'normal inference' in holding that 'may' in section 9 is permissive only . . . ." (citing,
inter alia, Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151-56 (4th Cir. 1993))).
96See id. at 159-60.
- 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
9 See id. at 195.
9 Photopaint,335 F.3d at 157 (citing Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 199, 204).
'0 Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 198.
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permissive language in a statute can be defeated by legislative intent
or inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute.o10
In light of Cortez Byrd, the Second Circuit declined to rely solely
on the general permissive meaning of "may" for purposes of
determining whether section 9 imposes a one-year statute of
limitations.10 2 Instead, the court looked to the purposes of the FAA,
as well as available indications of congressional intent, for evidence
to support a mandatory interpretation.10 3 The court found the presence
of the phrase "at any time within one year" to be a clear indication
of legislative intent to impose a mandatory one-year time limit,
reasoning that unless it "creates a time limitation within which
one 'may' apply for confirmation, the phrase lacks incremental
meaning."'" Because of this, the court concluded that while the
word "may" in section 9 is itself permissive, it is only so "within the
scope of the preceding adverbial phrase: '[a]t any time within one
year after the award is made."' 0 5 The court reasoned that this
interpretation is an intuitive one and cited the filing of tax returns as
an analogous example.'0
As a final point, the Second Circuit reasoned that a mandatory
one-year limitations period best promotes the underlying policies of
the FAA. In particular, the court stated that a mandatory interpretation
furthers the value of finality in the resolution of disputes:
One of the FAA's purposes is to provide parties with an
effective alternative dispute resolution system which gives
litigants a sure and expedited resolution of disputes while
reducing the burden on the courts. Arbitration should
therefore provide not only a fast resolution but one which
establishes conclusively the rights between the parties. A one

101See id. at 198-99 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) and
Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 38 (1977)).
"See Photopaint,335 F.3d at 157 ("We therefore consider the text of section 9 without
affording decisive effect to the ordinary permissive meaning of 'may."').
03
1 See id. (stating that the normal meaning of a word "can be defeated by indications of
legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the
statute" (quoting Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 706) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
'mId. ("We read statutes to avoid rendering any words wholly superfluous." (citing, inter
alia, Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir.
2000))).
05
Id. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000)).
See id. ("Our construction of the text is not inevitable, but it is intuitive: for example,
106
tax returns nay be filed anytime up to April 15, but one senses at once that the phrase is
permissive only up to a point." (emphasis added)).
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year limitations period is instrumental in achieving this
goal. 0 7 Interestingly, while imposing this mandatory interpretation, the
Second Circuit concluded that Photopaint's motion to confirm the
arbitration award was nonetheless timely. 108 The court stated that, by
entering into a series of written agreements to extend time limitations
during their settlement negotiations, the parties effectively "tolled"
the FAA's one-year limitations period. 109 This holding, as well as the
possibility of other time extensions, will be examined in more detail
in Part V.
II. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF SECTION 9
As discussed in Part I, federal circuit courts have differed over
the significance of "may apply" in relation to the remaining language
of section 9. While the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' permissive
interpretation initially seems plausible, a close evaluation of the
language and structure of section 9 clearly favors the Second Circuit's
contrary interpretation that section 9 was meant to impose a one-year
statute of limitations.
A. Cortez Byrd and Permissive Statutory Language
The basis of the permissive interpretation is section 9's statement
that a party "may apply" for confirmation of an arbitration award. The
Fourth and Eighth Circuits reasoned that when "may" is used in a
statute, it "normally confers a discretionary power, not a mandatory
power."1 10 Because section 9 utilizes both "may" and "shall," the
courts concluded that each word carries its normal meaning and
"may" is therefore permissive.'11
This rationale, however, was rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Cortez Byrd, which was decided after Sverdrup
and Val-U.112 In Cortez Bird, the Supreme Court contemplated
the meaning of the FAA's venue provisions, which provide that
the federal court for the district in which an arbitration award is

07

Id. (quoting In re Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1994)).
0 See id. at 160 (upholding the parties' agreement to alter the one-year period).
'"Id. ("Smartlens and Photopaint agreed to toll any applicable limitations periods
imposed under the FAA.").
ioSverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 581 (8th Cir. 1998).
11See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 151.
112See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
1

902

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

made is the proper venue for the confirmation,H3 vacation,11 or
modification' 15 of an award. Each of these provisions contains
language that suggests a permissive reading. Section 10, for example,
provides that "the United States court in and for the district wherein
the [arbitration] award was made may make an order vacating the
award."ll 6 Similarly, section 11 states that the court "may make an
order modifying or correcting the award."' 17
Despite this permissive language, the Supreme Court in Cortez
Byrd held that the use of "may" in the venue provisions "is not
necessarily conclusive of congressional intent to provide for a
permissive or discretionary authority."118 While recognizing that
"may" usually carries a discretionary meaning, the Supreme Court,
citing its own precedent, announced that this normal meaning can be
defeated by legislative intent or inferences from the structure and
purpose of the statute.1 19
The Court proceeded to examine the history and purpose of the
FAA. Prior to the FAA's enactment in 1925, the general venue statute
applicable to arbitration was much more restrictive than the current
provisions in sections 9, 10 and 11 of the FAA.' 20 Unlike the earlier
statute, the FAA venue provisions are much more liberal and provide
parties to arbitration with more venue options for post-arbitration
disputes.121 In addition, the Supreme Court determined that the FAA
is designed to promote the "rapid and unobstructed enforcement of
arbitration agreements,"' 22 and that permissive venue provisions will
further such a policy. 123 Accordingly, the Court held that the history
and purpose of the FAA, and not solely the language, supports an
interpretation that the FAA's venue provisions are permissive.124
In subsequent cases, federal courts have repeatedly applied the
Supreme Court's analysis to ambiguous language in other federal
§ 9 (2006).
Id. § 10(a).
Id. § 11.
6
" Id. § 10(a) (emphasis added). Section 10(a) outlines four scenarios where vacating an
award is proper. See id.
7
" Id. § 11 (emphasis added).
"8 Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198 (2000).
9
"' See id. at 198-99 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) and
Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 38 (1977)).
120 See id. at 199; see also 28 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1926) (stating that a civil suit can only be
brought in the district where the defendant resided).
121See Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 200 ("The enactment of the special venue provisions in the
FAA ... had an obvious liberalizing effect. . . .").
122
Id. at 201 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
23 (1983)).
123See id.
24
1 See id. at 204.
1139 U.S.C.
4

11
5
11
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statutes. These include the Wilderness Act,12 5 the Wiretap Act,12 6 and
the Prompt Payment Act.127 In each case, the courts looked
beyond the statutory language and examined the context and history
of the specific statutes.1 2 8 This widespread application of Cortez
Byrd demonstrates that the mere presence of "may" in a statutory
provision does not make it permissive; instead, courts must look to
context, statutory history, or legislative intent to determine the
meaning of a provision's language.
In light of Cortez Byrd, the mere use of "may" in section 9 is not
sufficient for determining whether section 9's one-year time period
for summary confirmation is permissive or mandatory. As a result,
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' reliance on the normal meaning of
"may" is effectively outdated.129 Instead, the structure and purpose of
section 9, together with the FAA as a whole, must be examined to
determine the proper meaning of the statute's limitations language for
summary confirmation.
B. The Structure of Section 9
While words certainly influence how a statute is interpreted, they
are not the sole determinants of a law's overall meaning. Instead, like
everything else, words must be considered in context. This is the
backbone of the rule set forth by Cortez Byrd and its progeny. While
interpreting the word "may" as permissive certainly makes sense,
this interpretation can be rebutted by contrary inferences from the
context and structure of a statute.130 Section 9 provides a perfect
example.
125 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (2006) ("Within wilderness areas designated by this chapter the
use of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already become established, may be
permitted to continue. . . ." (emphasis added)).
12618 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2) (2006) ("In any other action under this section, the court may
assess as damages. . . ." (emphasis added)).
12731 U.S.C. § 3901(d)(2) (2006) ("A claim for an interest penalty not paid under this
chapter may be filed in the same manner as claims are filed with respect to contracts to provide
property or services for the District of Columbia Courts." (emphasis added)).
128 See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814, 817-18 (11th Cir. 2004) (examining the
history and language of other provisions of the Wiretap Act); Isle Royale Boaters Ass'n v.
Norton, 330 F.3d 777, 784-86 (6th Cir. 2003) (scrutinizing the overall purpose and context of
the Wilderness Act); Roth v. D.C. Courts, 160 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2001) (analyzing
the context of the use of "may" in bringing claims for unpaid interest under the Prompt Payment
Act).
129For this reason, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
disregarded the Fourth Circuit precedent of Sverdrup, instead adopting the Second Circuit's
interpretation of section 9. See Md. Transit Admin. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 372 F.
Supp. 2d 478, 483-84 (D. Md. 2005) ("The court adheres to its view that Sverdrup Corp. is a
candidate for reconsideration by the Fourth Circuit. . . .").
30
See Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 199 (2000); United
States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983); see also Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1104
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In relevant part, section 9 states that "at any time within one
year . . . any party to the arbitration may apply . . . for an order

confirming the award." 13' The Fourth and Eighth Circuits seemingly
disregard the presence of the language "within one year," and instead
focus on the statute's use of "may" over "must" or "shall."l 3 2 As
a result, these circuits hold that parties may apply for summary
confirmation beyond the one-year period in section 9.
This interpretation, however, leaves the phrase "within one year"
without any meaning. The Second Circuit made this same argument
in Photopaint,where the court found that if section 9 does not contain
a time limitation, the phrase "at any time within one year" becomes
devoid of any meaning within the overall statute.133 This position is
buttressed by the well-established rule that courts should disfavor
interpretations that render statutory language superfluous.134 Under
a permissive interpretation of section 9, a party is not barred from
applying for summary confirmation beyond one year.135 In other
words, a party could completely disregard the language "within one
year" and apply for confirmation at any time. Such a reading deprives
the phrase "within one year" of any real purpose. By rendering this
language meaningless, the permissive interpretation violates an
established rule of statutory interpretation. 136 Instead, interpreting
section 9 to impose a mandatory one-year statute of limitations is
more appropriate in light of the provision's concurrent use of "within
one year" and "may apply." Thus, while a party is not required to
pursue summary confirmation of an arbitration award under the FAA,
the privilege to do so only lasts for one year.' 37 Unlike the permissive

(7th Cir. 1993) ("English offers so many possibilities that ... [a]ll depends on context.").
1319 U.S.C. §9 (2006) (emphasis added).
32
1 See Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573, 581 (8th Cir. 1998) ("If
Congress intended for the one year period to be a statute of limitations, then it could have used
the word 'must' or 'shall' in place of 'may' in the language of the statute."); Sverdrup Corp. v.
WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Congress was cognizant of the
difference in meaning between 'may' and 'must' and intended that the term 'may' be construed
as permissive.").
133
See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2003).
134
See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); In re Bateman, 515
F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2008); Connecticut ex ret. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 228
F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1285 (1lth Cir. 1999);
United3 5States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir. 1996).
' See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 156.
136
See cases cited supra note 134 and accompanying text.
37
1 Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 158 ("[E]ven though section 9's language [is] permissive, 'the
privilege conferred by section 9' [is] a privilege 'to move "at any time" within the year."'
(quoting The Hartbridge, 57 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1932) (per curiam))); see also Kerr-McGee
Refining Corp. v. MIT Triumph, 924 F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Under the [Federal]
Arbitration Act, a party has one yearto avail itself of summary proceedings for confirmation of
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reading, this interpretation gives practical meaning to both of the
statutory phrases at issue.
First, "may apply" will grant litigants the right to apply for
summary confirmation of the award under section 9, but does not
limit them to such a remedy. 13 8 It is well recognized that apart from
summary confirmation, a party is also free to file an action at law to
enforce an arbitration award.139 As a result, the purpose of section 9's
use of "may apply" is to give a party the choice to either pursue the
FAA's summary confirmation process or seek the traditional common
law remedy. 140
Second, the phrase "within one year" simply imposes a time
limit on a party's right to pursue summary confirmation under section
9. While a party has the option of summary confirmation, such
a privilege exists for only one year.14 1 This interpretation is
intuitive and, as the Second Circuit observed, can apply to other
time periods limiting the exercise of a statutory right.14 2 The
entitlement to summary confirmation under section 9 is similarly not
absolute. Absent a timely application for confirmation, a party is
simply deprived of section 9's remedy and must instead resort to
common law enforcement.
Unlike a permissive interpretation, imposing a one-year statute of
limitations for summary award confirmation gives effect to all of the
language in section 9. As the Supreme Court has stated, "a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

an award." (emphasis added)).
138
See Photopaint,335 F.3d at 159 ("In section 9. . . 'may' can be read to reflect a party's
discretion as to whether to 'apply to the court .. . for an order confirming the award."' (quoting
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000))); see also Ky. River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 120 (6th Cir. 1953)
("A party may ... apply to the court for an order confirming the award, but is not limited to
such remedy.").
39
1 See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 ("The FAA supplemented rather than extinguished any
previously existing remedies. Thus, an action at law remains a viable alternative to confirmation
proceedings under § 9."); see also Ky. River Mills, 206 F.2d at 120 (citing Red Cross Line v.
At. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924)) (noting that prior to the FAA, a common law action was the
proper means of enforcing an arbitration award).
'See
Photopaint,335 F.3d at 159.
41
1 See id. at 158; In re Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 32 (D.D.C. 1994) ("[A] party
may use § 9's summary confirmation process . . . only if it does so within one year after the
arbitration.").
142See, e.g., Photopaint,335 F.3d at 158 (observing that while tax returns may be filed at
any time before April 15, this phrase is permissive only up to a point, since tax returns must be
filed by April 15). Outside of the statutory context, a prime example of this interpretation is
something that people deal with on a daily basis: paying bills. A homeowner receives various
billing statements each month (electricity, cable, water, etc.), and each statement contains a
"payment due date." The homeowner may pay a bill at any time before the payment due date.
However, they must pay by the payment due date, or else they incur late fees or other penalties.
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there."l 4 3 While the FAA certainly contains permissive elements,
the language and structure of section 9 as a whole demonstrates
Congress's intent to impose a one-year statute of limitations for
summary confirmation of arbitration awards.
III. PROMOTING THE GOALS OF THE FAA
The purpose of section 9 as a part of the FAA provides further
support for a mandatory reading of the provision's one-year
limitations period. The FAA is designed to enforce arbitration
agreements, as well as promote "settling disputes efficiently and
avoiding long and expensive litigation." 1 " As a part of this overall
goal, section 9 provides a simple means of enforcing arbitration
awards that requires minimal expenditure of time and resources.145
By setting a definite time limit for summary confirmation, a one-year
statute of limitations better promotes not only section 9's expedited
process but also the overall purposes of FAA arbitration.
A. An Expedited ConfirmationProcess
By including section 9, the FAA provides for an expedited process
of arbitration award enforcement. As the Supreme Court recently
observed in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.," an
application for judicial confirmation "will get streamlined treatment
as a motion, obviating the separate contract action that would usually
be necessary to enforce . .. an arbitral award in court."147 As a result,

judicial review is extremely limited and a court "must grant" an order
enforcing the award, unless grounds exist for vacation, modification,
or correction under sections 10 and 11.148 In other words, section 9
is designed to provide an efficient avenue for award enforcement
and furthers the FAA's overall purpose of promoting "rapid and
unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements."l 4 9
43

1

Conn. Nat'1 Bank

v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).

144Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Folkways

Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Arbitration does not provide a system of 'junior varsity trial courts' offering the losing party
complete and rigorous de novo review. It is a private system of justice offering benefits of
reduced
delay and expense." (citation omitted)).
14 5
See Elliott, supra note 7, at 668.
146 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
47
1 Id. at 1402.
148See id. at 1405 ("There is nothing malleable about 'must grant,' which unequivocally
tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the 'prescribed' exceptions
applies.").
149Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
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As part of section 9, a one-year statute of limitations is
instrumental to this process of expedited award confirmation and
enforcement. By definition, "expedite" means "to execute promptly"
or "to accelerate the process or progress of."150 A one-year limitations
period achieves this effect by forcing parties to promptly apply to the
court to receive the benefit of summary confirmation. As a result,
arbitral disputes will be conclusively settled on an accelerated basis
and the parties will avoid "delay and obstruction in the courts."s15
This result makes sense when comparing section 9's confirmation
procedure to the remedy available at common law. Under the
common law, a party must file a separate cause of action for award
enforcement.15 2 This process is much different from section 9's
summary proceeding. First, while section 9 affords a party a summary
right to confirmation,15 3 an action at law places the burden of proof
on the party seeking enforcement.l- It is well established that
a successful party to common law arbitration must treat award
enforcement as if he or she were enforcing an ordinary contract.15 5
Since the burden of proof rests on a party bringing the contract
action, 15 6 this burden also applies to a party obtaining common
law enforcement of an arbitration award.157 Compared with the
simplicity of filing an application for confirmation under section 9,158
a common law action is much more burdensome to the party seeking
enforcement.
Second, section 9 requires a court to immediately confirm
the award unless certain limited statutory exceptions apply.159
0

s MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds.,

10th ed. 2002).
15'Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
52
1 See Ky. River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 120 (6th Cir. 1953).
153See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
54
1 See Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1504.
55
1 See Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Button & Goode, Inc., 219 A.2d 801,
805-06 (Md. 1966) (observing that at common law, the arbitration award "could be sued on as a
contract" and the court's role would be to determine if the award "was entitled to be enforced as
a judgment of court"); Reith v. Wynhoff, 137 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Wis. 1965) ("[A]t common law
the entire proceeding of arbitration and award merely constituted a contract between the parties
and the successful party could only enforce the award as he could an ordinary contract.").
'56 See Ferranti Int'l, P.L.C. v. Jasin, 47 F. App'x 103, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
burden rests on the party alleging breach of contract and must be satisfied by a preponderance
of the evidence); see also Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1504 (stating that the burden of proof
traditionally lies with the plaintiff in a common law action).
' See, e.g., Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1504.
58
See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402 (observing that an application under section 9
receives "streamlined treatment as a motion").
59
' See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006) (stating that a court must confirm an award unless the
exceptions under §§ 10 or 11 apply).
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Conversely, in an action at law, any common law defense to a
contract action is theoretically available to the party opposing
confirmation of the award.16 0 Since arbitration is a creature of
contract,161 a court may be free to apply contract principles in
reviewing an award. 162 The public policy exception, for example is
so "rooted in the common law[ ] that a court may refuse to enforce
contracts that violate law or public policy."' 63 Thus, much like a party
opposing enforcement of a contract, a party opposing an arbitration
award can challenge its validity on public policy grounds and avoid
common law enforcement.
Apart from public policy concerns, a common law arbitration
award may also be attacked if it is "fraudulent or arbitrary or the
result of gross mistake of fact, or if it appears that the arbitrators
intended to follow the law and then based the award on a clear
misapprehension concerning the law." 1" Other recognized defenses
include situations when an award is not supported by facts or law,1 65
clearly results from defective reasoning,166 is "mistakenly based on a
crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact,"',6 or "fails to draw
its essence from the contract." 6 8 Compared with the limited grounds
for vacation or modification under the summary FAA process, 169a
party utilizing the common law route faces a broader spectrum of
roadblocks to enforcement of an award.o7 0 As a result, common law
enforcement of an arbitration award is a much more burdensome and
time-consuming process than section 9's summary procedure.' 7 '

1
OSee Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1505; see also Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1406
(noting that common law enforcement arguably involves a different scope of judicial review
than confirmation under § 9).
16 1 Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
62
1 See generally Gray H. Miller & Emily Buchanan Buckles, Essay, Reviewing
Arbitration Awards in Texas, 45 Hous. L. REv. 939, 957-61 (2008) (discussing common law
review of arbitration awards and arguing for expanded review under principles of contract law).
'63Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration in
original) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,42 (1987)).
164
Rueda v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 175 P.2d 778, 788 (Or. 1946).
165
See Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2008).
1
See id.
67
1 Id. (quoting Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
16 Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. SM Prop. Mgmt., L.L.C., 519 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2008).
'See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2006) (listing limited grounds for vacation or modification of
an arbitration award, all of which require some form of misconduct, material mistake, or lack of
authority by the arbitrator).
70
oSee discussionsupra notes 163-68 and accompanying text; cf Miller & Buckles, supra
note 162, at 958-60 (noting that contract law provides for expanded judicial review of
arbitration awards).
17 See Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1504-05.
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These differences show that it makes little sense to grant a party an
indefinite period of time in which to seek summary confirmation
under section 9. The permissive interpretation of the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits, however, seemingly grants this unlimited period.17 2
The logical consequence is that resolution of arbitral disputes under
the FAA could be delayed indefinitely.173 This would render section
9's confirmation process anything but expeditious, since it would
result in the same delay and obstruction that occurs in an action
at law. Not only does this go against the fundamental purpose of
the FAA, 174 but it can hardly be said to align with the expedited
confirmation process contemplated by the Supreme Court in Hall
Street Associates.175
A mandatory one-year statute of limitations, however, avoids this
problem of delay and stands in accord with section 9's purpose. First,
a statute of limitations sets a definite time period during which a party
is permitted to move for summary confirmation.17 6 It thus avoids
the potential for indefinite delay associated with the permissive
interpretation.177 Second, the summary confirmation process is meant
to be rapid and simple, and requires prompt action.'78 A one-year
limitations period will achieve this rapidity, since it forces parties to
promptly file with the court in order to enjoy the benefits of summary
confirmation and avoid the increased burdens of common law

enforcement.17 9
The permissive interpretation adopted by the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits leads to the same problems that section 9 is designed to
help eliminate: delay and obstruction in the enforcement of
arbitration awards. 80 This result is contrary to what the Supreme
72

See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits do not identify any definite limitation to their
permissive interpretations of section 9. See Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d
573, 581 (8th Cir. 1998); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 156 (4th
Cir. 1993).
74
1 See supra notes 144 & 149 and accompanying text.
17 See 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 1402 (2008).
176See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. MIT Triumph, 924 F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir.
1991) ("Under the [Federal] Arbitration Act, a party has one year to avail itself of summary
proceedings for confirmation of an award.").
177See Elliott, supra note 7, at 681 (noting the potential for significant delay in the filing of
summary confirmation motions under a permissive interpretation of section 9).
78 See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402.
" See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2003)
("[A] party to an arbitration is entitled to the benefits of the streamlined summary proceeding
only if, as it may do, it files at any time within one year after the award is made." (emphasis
added)).
'8 Cf Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993)
(acknowledging that the goal of arbitration under the FAA and summary confirmation under
section 9 is to avoid "delay and obstruction in the courts").
1

In
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Court envisioned as the "streamlined" process offered by section
9 for confirmation of arbitration awards.'8 1 The Second Circuit's
mandatory interpretation, however, has the opposite effect and allows
it to better achieve section 9's ultimate purpose.
B. Promotionof Finalityand JudicialEconomy
Section 9's expedited confirmation process plays a fundamental
part in the FAA's overall goal of "settling disputes efficiently and
avoiding long and expensive litigation."1 8 2 Thus, the arbitral process
invokes important principles of both finality and judicial economy. 18 3
Despite arguments to the contrary, a one-year statute of limitations
under section 9 best promotes these twin aims of FAA arbitration.
1. A True Sense of Finality
Perhaps the chief benefit of a one-year limitations period is that it
provides true finality to parties in arbitration, thereby achieving one
of the FAA's primary goals.'8 Finality requires arbitration to
"provide not only a fast resolution but one which establishes
This not only
conclusively the rights between the parties."
distinguishes arbitration from other forms of dispute resolution, but
also prevents arbitration from simply becoming an initial step to
litigation.186
The Fourth Circuit reasoned, however, that a mandatory one-year
statute of limitations would undermine the finality of arbitration.'
The court believed that "[i]f the prevailing party failed to obtain a
confirmatory decree within the [one-year] period, the award would
become unenforceable."' 88 As a result, the court deemed a one-year
statute of limitations to be "repugnant to the intent of the FAA."189
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's concerns, a strict one-year
18

See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402.

182Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Folkways

Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
183 See Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 158 (noting that arbitration gives parties "a sure and
expedited resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts" (quoting In re Consol.
Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1994))).
8 See id.
5
' Id. (quoting Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. at 31).
1
s6See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
FunctionalAnalysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123, 126 (2002).
1
See Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 155 (4th Cir. 1993).
188
1d. at 156 (quoting Derwin v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 489-90 (1st Cir.
1983)). The Fourth Circuit believed that a strict deadline would force parties to "protect their
awards gained through arbitration by filing motions to confirm in every case." Id.
18seld.
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limitations period would not render an award completely
unenforceable; instead, it would merely make it unenforceable
under the FAA if a party misses the filing deadline.190 A party could
still seek common law enforcement of the award through an action at
law. 191 Given this alternative enforcement mechanism, a one-year
statute of limitations cannot be said to undermine the finality of
arbitration.
Quite to the contrary, imposing a mandatory time limit for
summary confirmation under section 9 would actually play an
instrumental part in promoting finality. The Second Circuit
recognized that a crucial requirement for achieving this finality is
the existence of an arbitration mechanism that creates certainty as
to the rights of the parties.' 92 Unlike a permissive time period, a
concrete one-year limitations period would fulfill this requirement,
while also achieving one of the core purposes of a statute of
limitations: to create certainty about a party's opportunity for
recovery.1 9 3 This mandatory time limit would provide a clear
guideline as to when parties may seek summary confirmation
under the FAA and when they must pursue common law
enforcement.194 The permissive interpretation defines no such limits.
Instead, it seemingly "open[s] the door to a motion to confirm years
after entry of the arbitration award." 95 Without any time limit for
obtaining summary confirmation, uncertainty will surely result. First,
a party seeking confirmation will be uninformed about the limits of
his or her ability to use section 9.196 Second, a party opposing
confirmation will not know when his or her potential liability on
an arbitration award ceases to exist. 197 This can hardly be seen as
9
'1 See Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. at 31 ("[A]wards that are confirmed within one
year have the effect of a court judgment and awards not confirmed are unenforceable under the
FAA." (emphasis added)).
1' See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155 (acknowledging that "an action at law remains a viable
alternative to confirmation proceedings under § 9"); Ky. River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111,
120 (6th Cir. 1953) ("A party may ... apply to the court for an order confirming the award, but
is not limited to such remedy.").
'See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. at 31).
193 See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002) (describing the "basic policies
[furthered by] all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certaintyabout
a plaintif's opportunity for recovery and a defendant's potential liabilities." (alterations in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000))).
194 See Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 159-60 (recognizing that a one-year limitations period
helps establish when section 9 confirmation is available and when it is not).
95
Elliott, supra note 7, at 681.
196In fact, the very purpose of a statute of limitations is to create certainty about a
plaintiff's opportunity to pursue a claim and seek recovery under a statute. See Young, 535 U.S.
at 47. 97
, See id. (stating that another purpose of a limitations period is to create certainty about a
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a resolution that "establishes conclusively the rights between the
parties."1 9 8 Instead, it leaves open critical questions regarding the
parties' rights and liabilities under the FAA, as well as the res judicata
effect of the arbitration award. 199
By imposing virtually no limit on when a party can seek summary
confirmation, a permissive interpretation of section 9 does nothing
to promote the desired finality in FAA arbitration. A mandatory
one-year statute of limitations, however, creates certainty as to the
availability of summary confirmation under section 9. As a result,
section 9 will guarantee the finality of arbitration and prevent it from
becoming "merely [a] prologue to prolonged litigation.,200
2. EnsuringJudicial Economy
A mandatory one-year statute of limitations also has important
implications for judicial economy. FAA arbitration provides an
efficient means of dispute resolution and reduces the burden on the
courts. 20 1 By submitting their disputes to arbitration and subsequently
pursuing summary award confirmation under section 9, parties
effectively avoid "inefficiency, delay and court congestion."20 2
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits relied on notions of judicial
economy in adopting a permissive interpretation of section 9. The
Fourth Circuit recognized that a common law enforcement remedy
exists independently of section 9's confirmation process.203 Seeking
this remedy involves filing an action at law to enforce the award as a
contract and is subject to a state's statute of limitations for contract
actions,2 04 which is typically longer than one year.205 The court

liabilities).
defendant's
198Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 158 (quoting In re Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 31
(D.D.C. 1994)).
' See generally William H. Hardie, Arbitration: Post-Award Procedures, 60 ALA. LAW.
314, 316 (1999) (noting that one reason to obtain judicial confirmation is to eliminate any
question of the award's res judicata effect).
200
Md. Transit Admin. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 478, 482 (D. Md.
2005) (quoting Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)) (rejecting
Sverdrup's permissive interpretation).
201
See Photopaint,335 F.3d at 158 (observing that the FAA seeks to provide "an effective
alternative dispute resolution system which . . . reduc[es] the burden on the courts" (quoting
Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. at 31)); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d
148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that one of arbitration's chief benefits is "eas[ing] the workload
of the courts" (quoting, inter alia, Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d
1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980))).
20 2
Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155.
203See id.
204See generally Elliott, supra note 7, at 687 (observing that an arbitration award is
enforceable under basic contract law).
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therefore concluded that a strict statute of limitations under section 9
"would be an exercise in futility . . . [because] it would merely

encourage, at the expense of judicial economy, the use of another
analogous method of enforcing awards." 206 In other words, the court
believed that a one-year statute of limitations would discourage the
use of section 9's summary process. According to the court, such a
result is contrary to the purposes of the FAA.207
The Fourth Circuit's argument seems to assume that section 9
confirmation and common law enforcement are one and the same.
Under this theory, a party's decision regarding which process to
pursue will be based solely on the applicable time limitations. This
argument, however, ignores the glaring differences between the two
processes. Confirmation under section 9 is a summary procedure,
which means that it does not involve the formalities of a full court
proceeding. 2 0 8 Conversely, an action at law not only imposes the
burden of proof on the party seeking confirmation but also allows for
virtually any common law contract defense.209
Given these differences, it cannot be automatically assumed that a
party will choose common law enforcement simply because it allows
more time for filing with the court. Instead, a party will likely weigh
the differences between section 9 and the common law remedy in
deciding which enforcement option to pursue. On one side is a simple
process that requires confirmation in virtually every case. 2 10 On the
other end of the spectrum is a remedy that imposes a more stringent
burden of proof and allows for innumerable defenses. 2 11 Thus, while

205See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-11 (West 1999) (allowing ten years for contract
enforcement); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2003) (providing a six-year limitations period
for contract actions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2004) (allowing fifteen years to
enforce a contract).
206Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 155. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that "[t]o
obtain their awards, individuals who prevailed in arbitration and failed to confirm within the
one-year time limit would simply resort to filing actions at law." Id.
20
7 See id.
208See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (8th ed. 2004) (providing the definition of a
"summary proceeding"); Susan Wiens & Roger Haydock, Confirming Arbitration Awards:
Taking the Mystery Out of a Summary Proceeding, 33 WM. MTCHELL L. REv. 1293, 1294
(2007) ("[W]hen parties seek confirmation, they do not relinquish the efficiency they gained
through arbitration because the confirmation process is as simple and straightforward as
arbitration itself ... ).
209
See Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1504-07.
21
oSee Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) ("There is
nothing malleable about 'must grant,' which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in
all cases, except when one of the 'prescribed' exceptions applies.").
211 See Gruendel, supra note 63, at 1505 ("In an action at law, any defense theoretically
available under common law to a contract claim should be available .... ); Miller & Buckles,
supra note 162, at 958-60 (noting that contract law allows more for extensive judicial review of
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section 9 would impose a stricter time deadline, it offers the
substantial benefit of a simpler and faster confirmation process. Faced
with this choice, parties should not be dissuaded from utilizing
section 9's confirmation process simply because of a shorter time
period.212 Instead, they may be encouraged to file timely applications
in order to take advantage of section 9's confirmation shortcut 21 3 and
avoid the drawn-out process of common law enforcement.
The Fourth Circuit also believed that a mandatory one-year statute
of limitations would discourage private settlement of disputes in
a post-award setting, and instead lead to a flood of section 9
confirmation motions.2 14 As a result, there would be an increased
burden on the court system, 2 15 and the FAA's poal of promoting
judicial economy would be effectively frustrated.2 1
Despite the Fourth Circuit's concerns, a mandatory limitations
period would not frustrate private settlement or lead to a drastic
increase in the burden on courts for two reasons. First, the Fourth
Circuit seemingly overlooks the summary and expedited nature of
confirmation under the FAA. Section 9 provides that a court must
confirm the award unless one of the limited grounds exist for
modification, correction, or vacation, "as prescribed" in sections 10
and 11.217 Accordingly, judicial review is very limited 2 18 and the
confirmation process is a simple one for the court.2 19 Compared with
the alternative-facing a common law enforcement action or even
going to trial-the burden on the courts will be at worst minimal.220

awards).
arbitration
2 12
Cf Wiens & Haydock, supra note 208, at 1301 (suggesting that "the careful practitioner
to confirm an award under the FAA within a year after the award is made").
will seek
2 13
See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403 (describing the FAA as providing a shortcut to
confirmation).
2 14
See Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1993).
215See id. at 155.
216

See id.

U.S.C. § 9 (2006); see also Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1402 ("Under the terms of §
9, a court 'must' confirm an arbitration award 'unless' it is vacated, modified, or corrected 'as
prescribed' in §§ 10 and 11.").
21
8See Wiens & Haydock, supra note 208, at 1307 (asserting that the FAA does "not
permit the court to reconsider the merits of the dispute"); see also United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) ("[T]he courts play only a limited role when
asked to review the decision of an arbitrator. The courts are not authorized to reconsider the
merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or
on misinterpretation of the contract.").
219See, e.g., In re Consol. Rail Corp., 867 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1994) ("Under the
FAA, the confirmation process is a ministerialtask for a court." (emphasis added)).
22oSee id. at 32 (finding that the burden on courts facing motions for summary
confirmation "would be less than it would be if the court had to settle the disputes through
dispositive motions or trials").
217 9
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Second, the Second Circuit's decision in Photopaintdemonstrates
that parties will still engage in private post-arbitration settlement,
even with a one-year statute of limitations. In Photopaint,the parties
continued to negotiate a settlement of their dispute even after the
arbitrator had entered his final award. 22 1 To do so, the parties made a
series of agreements to extend any applicable time limitations.222 The
Second Circuit found that, "as a matter of law," the agreements had
tolled section 9's one-year limitations period.223 As a result, summary
confirmation was still possible under section 9, even though more
than one year had passed.224 Thus, Photopaint shows that it is still
entirely possible, and actually quite easy, to conduct post-award
settlement negotiations without running afoul of section 9's one-year
limitations period.
By simply agreeing amongst themselves, parties may pause section
9's clock and attempt to resolve their differences before going to
court. Such a possibility, together with the minimized burden on the
courts, shows that a mandatory interpretation of section 9 will not
lead to the delay or inefficiency feared by the Fourth Circuit. Instead,
it will achieve the exact opposite.
IV. PROMOTING CONSISTENCY
The interplay between the FAA and state arbitration acts lends
further support to a need for a one-year statute of limitations under
section 9. While the FAA governs the majority of arbitrations,22 5
parties have the option to instead apply a state arbitration act to their
agreement.2 26 Each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
has its own arbitration statute.227 Much like section 9, eleven of these
221See

222Id.

Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2003).

223

Id.

224See

id. at 161.
Wiens & Haydock, supra note 208, at 1298 ("The FAA governs almost all
arbitrations because it controls awards issued in cases involving interstate commerce, a broad
standard encompassing virtually all transactions and relationships."); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2006) (providing for the enforceability of arbitration agreements that involve interstate
commerce); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1995) (stating that
the FAA's scope should be read broadly to reach the limits of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause).
226The scope of arbitration is determined by contract, so parties are free to agree on the
law governing their arbitral disputes. Parties typically provide that the FAA governs arbitration,
but retain the option of choosing an applicable state law. Cf Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
220 (1985)) (stating that the general purpose of arbitration statutes is to enforce parties'
contractual agreements).
22
7See Wiens & Haydock, supra note 208, at 1294 n.5 (listing the arbitration acts for all
fifty states and the District of Columbia).
225See
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states provide a one-year limitations period for summary confirmation
of arbitration awards. 22 8 The remaining thirty-nine states and the
District of Columbia, however, set different limitations periods,229 or
rely on a state's general statute of limitations for the execution on a
230
judgment.
Under a permissive interpretation of section 9, the FAA
is effectively left without a statute of limitations for summary
confirmation of arbitration awards.2 3 1 Consequently, courts
considering motions to confirm under the FAA will likely be forced
to apply the statute of limitations of the applicable state arbitration
act.2 3 2 The result is that a party's application for confirmation under
section 9, for purposes of a time limitation, will be treated as if it
were brought under state law. A party will therefore be subject to
different limitations periods depending on the state in which the
motion for summary confirmation was made.233
For instance, suppose a party seeks confirmation under the FAA in
a federal district court in Ohio. Absent a statute of limitations in
22 8
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-417 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5713
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-12 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4209 (2009); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-15-21 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7510 (McKinney 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.09 (West 2006); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 10-3-11 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 788.09 (West 2001). The eleventh state, Michigan,
codifies the one-year requirement in its state court rules. See MICH. CT. R. 3.602(1).
229See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1288 (West 2007) (imposing a four-year statute of
limitations); D.C. CODE § 12-301(8) (2001) (providing a three-year statute of limitations); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-12 (West 1999) (allowing twenty years for satisfaction of a court
judgment).
2 30
The majority of states utilize the Uniform Arbitration Act, which declined to include the
one-year language of the FAA. Instead, the drafters felt that a state's general statute of
limitations for executing on a judgment was appropriate. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 22 cmt.
2 (2000); see also Wiens & Haydock, supra note 208, at 1299 (stating that thirty-eight states
have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act and the remaining twelve have adopted it in part); id.
at 1301 (noting that for states utilizing the Uniform Arbitration Act, "the general statute of
limitations for filing and executing on a judgment determines the question of timing").
231Courts adopting the permissive interpretation clearly indicate that section 9 does not
have a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Val-U Constr. Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 146 F.3d 573,
581 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that "the one-year period is not a statute of limitations"); Paul
Allison, Inc. v. Minikin Storage of Omaha, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Neb. 1978) ("[T]he
'one year' provision of § 9 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act is not tantamount to a statute of
limitations.").
232The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a federal statute is silent as to a
statute of limitations, a court should apply the most closely related statute of limitations under
state law. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); see
also United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 (1981) (applying a state statute of
limitations to a claim under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461, 463-64 (1947) (applying Ohio and Pennsylvania statutes of limitations to claims
under the National Bank Act); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (applying a
Louisiana statute of limitations to the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
233 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1288 (allowing four years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-417 (permitting one year for filing); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-12 (allowing twenty years
for satisfaction of a court judgment).
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section 9, the court would apply the Ohio Arbitration Act's
confirmation provision.234 The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, has
held the statute to impose a one-year statute of limitations for
obtaining summary confirmation.235 As a result, the federal district
court would be required to impose a one-year statute of limitations
for confirmation of the award.236 On the other hand, if the same
party files for FAA summary confirmation in Indiana, a federal
district court would apply the confirmation provision of Indiana's
version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which does not include a
237
statute of limitations. In this situation, Indiana federal courts have
applied Indiana's general statute of limitations for enforcing court
judgments, 2 38 which currently imposes a twenty-year limitations
period. 2 39 Accordingly, a party seeking confirmation in Indiana would
have twenty years to do so; yet, by crossing state lines into Ohio, that
same party has only a one-year window to invoke section 9 for the
same arbitration award.
As this example illustrates, a permissive interpretation of section
9's limitations period would lead to different applications of the
provision on a state-by-state basis. In a sense, a party's ability to
obtain summary confirmation under the FAA would depend entirely
on state law, since the timeliness of a section 9 application would
be determined by state statutes of limitation. This idea is in clear
conflict with one of the core purposes of the FAA: "to create a body
of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [federal] Act." 240
Interpreting section 9 to create a one-year statute of limitations, on
the other hand, does not create this inconsistency. First, section 9
would not be silent as to a statute of limitations, thus obviating the
need to apply a state's confirmation deadline.241 As a result, the
234See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.09 (West 2006) ("At any time within one year after
an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court of common pleas for an order confirming the award.").
2 35
See Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Warren City Bd. of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ohio 1985)
(holding that "the motion to confirm must be made within one year after the award is rendered"
added)).
(emphasis
236
See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158.
237
See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-12 (West 1999); Williams v. U.S. Steel, 877 F. Supp.
1240, 1245 (N.D. Ind. 1995) ("The uniform act does not ... provide a limitations period for
[arbitration award] enforcement."), af'd,70 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1995).
238
See Williams, 877 F. Supp. at 1245 (noting that the ten-year limitations period of
Indiana's prior statute of limitations for enforcing court judgments, former IND. CODE ANN. §
would normally be applied to actions to enforce arbitration awards).
34-1-2-2,
239
See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-11-2-12.
240Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(emphasis added).
241 See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 (stating that an analogous state statute of limitations is
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availability of summary confirmation would not depend on the state
where the application is made, and would be consistent on a national
scale. Not only does this promote consistency, it also furthers the
establishment of a "federal substantive law" of arbitration under the
FAA. 24 2 In addition, creating a mandatory one-year limitations period
would align section 9 with comparable state summary confirmation
provisions, each of which have been interpreted to impose a one-year
statute of limitations.2 43 This would have the added bonus of
producing parity between federal and state arbitration law. The result
would be both certainty as to the availability of summary award
confirmation and an overall sense of finality in the arbitration
process. 2 "
A permissive interpretation of section 9's limitations period would
lead to serious inconsistencies in the availability of FAA summary
confirmation on a national scale. Since a firm one-year statute of
limitations eliminates this problem, a mandatory interpretation is
necessary not only to ensure consistent application of section 9 but
also to promote the larger goals of the FAA and arbitration.
V. TOLLING THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD

Imposing a one-year statute of limitations for summary
confirmation is the most logical and appropriate reading of section 9,
in light of both the purposes of FAA arbitration and the established
canons of statutory interpretation. Like any other statute of
limitations, section 9's one-year period would be subject to "tolling,"
which suspends the running of a statute of limitations under certain
circumstances. 245 In other words, parties would be able to file for
summary confirmation beyond one year if the court hearing their

applied only if the federal law is silent as to a limitations period).
242 Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
24 3
See FIA Card Servs. v. Gachiengu, 571 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5713 (2008)); Suwanchai v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
528 F. Supp. 851, 857, 861 (D.N.H. 1981) (interpreting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 (1981));
Spearhead Constr. Corp. v. Bianco, 665 A.2d 86, 91-92 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (interpreting
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-417 (West 1995)); Hardin Constr. Group v. Fuller Enters., Inc.,
462 S.E.2d 130, 131 (Ga. 1995) (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-12 (1995)); Patenaude v.
John Hancock Prop. & Cas. Ins. Cos., 785 A.2d 563, 564-65 (R.L 2001) (interpreting R.L GEN.
LAWS § 10-3-11 (2001)).
24
See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cit. 2003).
2 45
See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining "toll" as
"to stop the running of," "tolling agreement" as an agreement "to extend the statutory
limitations period," and "tolling statute" as "[a] law that interrupts the running of a statute of
limitations"); see also Babbin et al., supra note 87, at 1197 (observing that "the Photopaint
court also held that the one-year statutory period [in section 9] can be waived or tolled." (citing
Photopaint,335 F.3d at 160)).
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dispute determines it to be appropriate or necessary under the
circumstances. As a result, a permissive interpretation is simply not
necessary to give effect to the policies surrounding the FAA.
A. Contractually "Pause" the Running of Section 9's One-Year
Summary ConfirmationPeriod
One of the concerns of the Fourth and Eighth Circuits was that a
mandatory one-year statute of limitations would adversely affect
parties' ability to privately settle their dispute after an arbitrator
renders an award.
In light of courts' ability to toll section 9,
however, this concern is clearly not warranted.
Because arbitration is a creature of contract,247 parties are
generally free to "specify by contract the rules under which [an]
arbitration will be conducted." 248 Included is the ability to tailor
the procedure by which arbitration is conducted under the FAA.249
Parties can therefore contractually agree to toll section 9's one-year
limitations period in order to conduct settlement negotiations. This is
precisely what the Second Circuit did when it held section 9 to
impose a one-year limitations period.250 In Photopaint, the parties
agreed in writing to toll any limitations periods imposed by the
FAA. 2 5 1 The Second Circuit indicated that ordinary common law
principles allow parties to make such tolling agreements, 252 and
therefore concluded that their motion to confirm was timely.253
Much like the parties in Photopaint, individuals involved in
arbitration can easily suspend section 9's one-year confirmation
deadline to engage in post-award settlement negotiations. 254 A
246See, e.g., Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1993)
(expressing concern that a mandatory one-year statute of limitations would force parties to file
motions to confirm in every case).
24 7
See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008) (noting that
arbitration is contractual in nature); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) ("Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent ... and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.").
248Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 479.
24 9
See Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1404 (observing that the FAA allows parties to tailor
many features of arbitration by contract).
250See Photopaint Techs., L.L.C. v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2003);
Babbin et al., supra note 87, at 1197.
251See Photopaint, 335 F.3d at 160 ("[Tlhe undisputed record establishes, as a matter of
law, that Smartlens and Photopaint agreed to toll any applicable limitations periods imposed
under the FAA.").
252
See Babbin et al., supra note 87, at 1197; see also Photopaint,335 F.3d at 161 ("[Tihe
letter agreement was drafted by counsel for [the defendant], and we generally interpret
contractual ambiguities against the drafter.").
2 53
Photopaint,335 F.3d at 161.
254See id. at 160; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
("[W]e give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing
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permissive interpretation of section 9 is simply not necessary to
enable parties to protect their ability to privately settle their dispute in
a post-award setting before resorting to summary confirmation.
B. Equitable Tolling When Justice Requires
Common law notions of equity further demonstrate that a
permissive interpretation of section 9 is unnecessary to promote
private settlement or other underlying policies of arbitration. All
federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling, which
suspends the running of the statute in the interest of fairness to a
party 2 55 and allows that party to file an action beyond a statutory
period if required by equitable principles. 25 6 Section 9's one-year
confirmation period is no exception.
Proponents of the permissive interpretation express concern that a
one-year statute of limitations will encourage a losing party to avoid
voluntarily honoring an arbitration award.m The argument goes that
a losing party may mislead the prevailing party or adopt a "wait and

violence
to the policies behind ... the FAA.").
255
See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) ("It is hombook law that limitations
periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling unless tolling would be inconsistent with
the text of the relevant statute . . . ." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989) (observing that time requirements are
often subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling); see also Young, 535 U.S. at 49-50
(applying equitable tolling to section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code); Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (applying equitable tolling to the charge-filing
period in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 857-58
(8th Cir. 2008) (applying equitable tolling to the one-year limitations period for habeas relief
under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349,
1353 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that equitable tolling can be applied to the limitations period for
challenging a denial of benefits under section 405(g) of the Social Security Act); Doherty v.
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 16 F.3d 1386, 1393-94 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that equitable
tolling is applicable to the arbitration time limits of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act).
25 6
See Haekal v. Refco, Inc., 198 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990)) (stating that in lawsuits between private litigants,
time requirements are subject to equitable tolling when necessary to prevent unfaimess). One
situation where the Supreme Court has found equitable tolling to apply is when parties have
failed to assert a claim within a statutory deadline under the mistaken belief that they have been
included in a class action that was timely filed. See Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 499-501
(1967) (holding that a sixty-day filing deadline for Japanese-Americans to reclaim assets seized
during World War II was equitably tolled because the plaintiffs had mistakenly believed they
were included in a timely class action, due to an ambiguous class definition, and they would
be precluded from asserting their right to reclaim assets).
otherwise
257
See, e.g., Kolowski v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., No. 07 C 4964,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22935, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2008) (predicting that Illinois courts
would interpret section 9 as permissive and reasoning that a mandatory interpretation "might
also encourage a losing party to delay compliance [with the award] in the hope that the winning
party would fail to timely recognize" the need to file for summary confirmation).
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see" approach to "wait and see if the other party will file the motion
to confirm in a timely manner and let that determine if they will honor
the arbitration award."258 These proponents believe such a practice
would frustrate judicial economy and defeat the purposes of the
FAA.2 59
However, this "wait and see" approach, as well as other
misleading conduct, would likely justify equitably tolling section 9's
one-year limitations period. Courts often permit equitable tolling
when a party has been induced or tricked by an opposing party's
conduct into allowing a filing deadline to pass, or where one party has
otherwise purposefully misled his opponent regarding the cause of
26
action.260 Under this theory, a "wait and see" approach, or other
misleading conduct 26 1 adopted by a party opposing confirmation,
would invoke equitable tolling and permit summary confirmation
beyond the one-year period.262 A party opposing confirmation
therefore loses any incentive to trick or induce a prevailing party into
missing section 9's deadline. As a result, a losing party would be
dissuaded from avoiding voluntary settlement of the arbitration award
and judicial economy would be fulfilled.
This principle finds support from analogous state arbitration
provisions. Ohio courts, for example, have consistently applied
equitable tolling to the confirmation provision of the Ohio Arbitration
Act.263 Much like section 9, the Ohio provision provides that "[a]t
any time within one year after an award in an arbitration proceeding
is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court . . . for an
order confirming the award."2 6 While Ohio courts interpret this

Elliott, supra note 7, at 688.
See id. (arguing that a "wait and see" approach defeats the national policy favoring
arbitration).
2
6o See Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in the context of 9
U.S.C. § 12, that equitable tolling is allowed where "the claimant [is] materially misled
into missing the [statutory] deadline"); Doherty, 16 F.3d at 1393 (finding equitable tolling
appropriate where "the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of
action").
261
Suppose the losing party agrees to enter settlement negotiations after an award is
rndered but has no intention of voluntarily honoring the award. Instead, the sole purpose is to
deceive the prevailing party into allowing the one-year period to elapse. Such conduct would
likely qualify as "inducing" or "tricking" the prevailing party, and thereby invoke equitable
tolling.
26 2
Summary confirmation beyond one year would be permitted because equitable tolling
would suspend the running of section 9's one-year statute of limitations in the interest of
fairness. See cases cited supra note 260 and accompanying text; see also Young v. United
States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 (2002) ("Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in
[the equitable tolling] principle.").
light of
26 3
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.09 (West 2006).
26 4
258
25 9

Id. (emphasis added).
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language to impose a one-year statute of limitations,26 5 they also find
that it gives courts the "discretion to permit summary application
within a reasonable time beyond one year for good cause shown."266
Much like equitable tolling, this "good cause" interpretation permits
application for summary confirmation beyond one year if equity
and fairness so require. While the specific terminology of the Ohio
exception is different, it achieves the same result: losing parties have
no incentive to avoid settlement of arbitration awards and courts are
able to maximize judicial economy.
By permitting summary confirmation beyond one-year if justice so
requires, equitable tolling serves as a safeguard to a party's ability
to obtain judicial enforcement of an arbitration award. This
doctrine, together with the availability of contractual tolling, not only
encourages parties to voluntarily honor arbitration awards but also
promotes the principle of judicial economy in arbitration, thereby
negating any need for a permissive interpretation of section 9.
CONCLUSION

Imposing a mandatory one-year statute of limitations for summary
confirmation under the FAA is both the necessary and the most
logical interpretation of section 9. Such a reading gives effect to all of
the statutory language and stands in accord with the established rule
that language alone does not always govern.267 Apart from the
statutory language itself, a one-year limitations period best promotes
the important values of finality and judicial economy-the backbones
of arbitration in the American judicial system.26 8
Absent a firm time limit for summary confirmation, parties will be
faced with inconsistent application of the FAA on a national scale, as
well as uncertainty about their rights in a post-award setting. These
realities stand in direct conflict with the very purposes of the FAA: to
both "create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability" 269 and
provide for "settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and
expensive litigation.,,2 70 A mandatory one-year limitations period not
2 65

See Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Warren City Bd. of Educ., 480 N.E.2d 456,459 (Ohio 1985)
(holding that under the Ohio Arbitration Act, a motion to confirm must be made within one year
after an award is made).
266 Russo v. Chittick, 548 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added); see
also Ayers v. R.A. Murphy Co., 839 N.E.2d 80, 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (following the
interpretation established in Russo).
26 7
See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198 (2000).
268
See discussion supra Part fl.B.
269Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
270
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Folkways
Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
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only promotes these dual purposes but also serves to conclusively
establish the rights of parties in arbitration. As a result, section 9 will
do its part to ensure that arbitration retains its status as a favored form
of alternative dispute resolution and does not become "merely [a]
prologue to prolonged litigation.27
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